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Third-Party Funding in International Arbitration:
The ICCA Queen-Mary Task Force
By William W. Park† & Catherine A. Rogers‡

I.

Introduction

Third-party funding raises a host of ethical and procedural issues for international
arbitration, perhaps most notably in connection with arbitrator comportment. It would be
a brave arbitrator indeed who ignored the potential conflicts raised by his service as
consultant to an institution bankrolling a claimant in a case sub judice before the
arbitrator. Given the funder’s  stake  in  the  award,  and  possible involvement in selection
of  the  arbitral  tribunal,  similar  concerns  arise  when  colleagues  in  the  arbitrator’s  law firm
serve as counsel or adviser to a funder, or when an arbitrator is called to rule on cost
allocation or security in a context where the  funder’s  participation becomes relevant.
As third-party funding has become been an increasingly global phenomenon in
national courts,1 the institutions which provide such financial backing to litigation include
not only specialized firms, but also insurance companies, investment banks, and hedge
funds, collectively capitalized well into the billions. In recent years, funders have taken a
particularized interest in international arbitration. Funders report that upwards of ten
percent of their investments are in international arbitration disputes,2 both commercial
and investor-state arbitration.3
The need for sustained study of these concerns prompted establishment of a Task
Force on Third-Party Funding in International Arbitration, convened by the International
Council for Commercial Arbitration (ICCA) along with Queen Mary College at the
University of London. As discussed below, the Task Force will assess both real and
perceived concerns that the relatively new practice raises, as well as what might be done,
and why.
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1
For a survey of this growth and the reasons why, see Chapter 5 in CATHERINE A. ROGERS,
ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (Oxford University Press 2014).
2
Kantor, supra note 5, at 69 (reporting Credit Suisse describes 10% of its portfolio in international
arbitration, and similar investments by Juridica and Burford Capital Limited).
3
Eric De Brabandere & Julia Lepeltak, Third Party Funding in International Investment
Arbitration, GROTIUS CENTRE WORKING PAPER NO. 2012/1 (June 5, 2012) at 6, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2078358 (documenting rapid increase of third-party funding in international
arbitration in the last decade). See also Mark Kantor, Third-Party Funding in International Arbitration: An
Essay About New Developments, in 24(1) ICSID REV. 65, 66, (2009) (third-party  funding  is  “becoming  a  
feature  of  international  arbitration”).
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International arbitration attracts funders in part because such cases typically
involve high-value claims, 4 proceedings with no substantive appeal, 5 potential for
streamlined procedures, the ability to control litigation variables such as the  arbitrator’s  
expertise, and the enforcement mechanisms of international conventions.6
Funders generally treat their investment portfolios as proprietary information. 7
Moreover, most funding agreements are confidential, and the funders’   presence   in
disputes is often undisclosed.8 In a few international arbitration cases, the presence of
third-party funding has become public. In some cases disclosure may be by design,9
while in others disclosure has been the result of disputes between the funder and the
funded party and/or its counsel. 10 As a relatively new practice that operates mostly
behind the scenes, the basic mechanics of third-party funding are not always wellunderstood.
Funder participation raises a host of vital issues, such as the funders’  relationship  
with parties and counsel in managing the dispute, allocation of costs and security for
costs, transparency and disclosure, confidentiality, attorney ethics, arbitrator conflicts of
interest, tribunal powers, and potential relations with institutions.
4

Since 2001, ten arbitrations have yielded awards over USD 1bn (one investor-state arbitration
and nine commercial awards), and another 20 arbitrations have resulted in awards of USD 500m or more
(three investor-state and 17 commercial arbitrations). Michael Goldhaber, Arbitration Scorecard 2013, AM.
LAW.,
June
24,
2013,
http://www.americanlawyer.com/PubArticleTAL.jsp?id=1202608198051&Arbitration_Scorecard_2013&sl
return=20130714160934.
5
Although international arbitration is often critiqued as less speedy and cost-effective than
corporate   parties  desire,   the   question   is   always   “less”   in   comparison   to   what?      In   national   legal   systems,  
even those regarded as highly effective, the average length of a case, which usually includes appeal as of
right, can be both long and unpredictable. In addition, complex commercial claims worth hundreds of
millions, sometimes billions, of dollars undoubtedly require time to adjudicate and are often extremely
expensive in any forum. That said, there is clearly room for improvement and several important reforms by
various arbitral institutions are working toward that end.
6
THIRD-PARTY FUNDING IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 11 (Lisa Bench Nieuwveld & Victoria
Shannon  eds.,  Kluwer  Law  Int’l.  2012).
7
See Maya Steinitz, The Litigation Finance Contract, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 455, 463 (2012).
8
See Maxi Scherer, Aren Goldsmith & Camille Fléchet, Third Party Funding in International
Arbitration in Europe: Part 1—Funders’  Perspectives, 2 INT’L BUS. L. J. 207, 217-18 (2012)  (“As  a  
general matter, funders require that their involvement not be revealed, unless the client is compelled to do
so.”).
9
See Jean E. Kalicki, Third-Party Funding in Arbitration: Innovations and Limits in SelfRegulation
(Part
2
of
2),
KLUWER
ARB.
BLOG
(Mar.
14,
2012),
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2012/03/14/third-party-funding-in-arbitration-innovations-andlimits-in-self-regulation-part-2-of-2/ (mentioning Oxus Gold PLC v. Republic of Uzbekistan et al., an
investment arbitration case conducted under the UNCITRAL Rules); Rusoro Mining Ltd. v. Bolivarian
Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/12/5 (unpublished) (identity of plaintiff funder, Calunias
Capital, willingly disclosed). See also Sebastian Perry, Bolivia claim attracts third party funder, GLOBAL
ARB. REV. (July 5, 2012), http://globalarbitrationreview.com (discussing third-party funding of claimant in
Guaracachi Am., Inc. v. Bolivia, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2011-17, but not disclosing identity of
funder).
10
See S&T Oil Equip. v. Juridica Invs. Ltd, 456 Fed.Appx. 481 (5th Cir. 2012) (where the identity
of Juridica, a company funding an ICSID arbitration between S & T Oil and the Romanian government,
became public when S & T Oil sued Juridica in U.S. federal court and appended a copy of the funding
agreement).
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The arrival of third-party funders will likely affect a broad range of participants in
the arbitral process in addition to arbitrators, for reasons mentioned above, and the parties
which receive funding. Counsel for litigants who which not coordinate with funders will
at some point stand across from opposing counsel who do. And all law firms compete in
a marketplace in which millions of dollars in legal fees come from funders.
Savvy business manager may incorporate confidentiality provisions into their
arbitration agreements which either facilitate or preclude disclosure to third-party
funders. Or the agreement may address costs in the event of funder participation. Issues
in the arbitration agreement may require assessment not only arbitrators but even as a
preliminary matter by institutions.
Investor-state arbitration has attracted particular attention by both funders and
their critics. The cases interest funders because of the potential for sizeable recoveries.
According to some anecdotal reports, at least two-thirds of ICSID cases filed in 2013
implicated claimants which had sought resources from a major funder.11
In theory, funders can provide support for either claimants or respondents.12 The
funding of claims, however, provides the greater upside potential, and therefore attracts
more attention. Some critics thus express concern that significant new funding in
investment arbitration cases will expand investor-state arbitration, creating a
disproportionate burden on States.13 Others laud the development as bolstering increased
access to justice, as investors whose claims were once considered too costly are now able
to obtain financing.
Some critics express concerns that less-scrupulous funders may be willing to fund
weak claims, willing to take high risks in exchange for potentially significant rewards,
with a consequential increase in dubious cases. For some, this critique overlaps with
concern about perceived disparities in investment arbitration that favor investors over
States.14 Analogies to questions about class arbitration will not escape the thoughtful
observer.15

11

This estimate was from only one (albeit major) funder on the Task Force. No reliable statistics
exist about whether these parties actually obtained funding.
12
Defense-side funding may occur, for instance, when the defendant wishes to bring costly
counterclaims or cross-claims (e.g., a claim for summary judgment), or, by sophisticated defendants willing
to pay funders a portion of pre-calculated loss mitigated through a successful defense. See Scherer et al.,
supra note 8, at 211; Goffrey McGovern et al., Third-Party Litigation Funding and Claim Transfer (RAND
2010),
at
22,
available
at
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/conf_proceedings/2010/RAND_CF272.pdf (last accessed Oct.
6, 2014). In practice, it rarely happens and, to date, no respondent-side funding has been reported in an
investment arbitration case by a commercial third-party funder.
13
See De Brabandere & Lepeltak, supra note 5, at 8; Marco de Morpurgo, A Comparative Legal
and Economic Approach to Third-Party Litigation Funding, 19 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 343, 384-85
(2011).
14
See Munir Maniruzzaman, Third-Party Funding in International Arbitration – A Menace or
Panacea?, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Dec. 29, 2012), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2012/12/29/thirdparty-funding-in-international-arbitration-a-menace-or-panacea/; De Brabandere & Lepeltek, supra note 5,
at 8.
15 See William W. Park, La jurisprudence américaine en matière de class arbitration: entre
débat politique et technique juridique,  2012  Revue  de  l’arbitrage  507
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II.

Salient Task Force Activities

The Task Force was launched in mid-2013.16 The authors serve as co-chairs, with
Professor Stavros Brekoulakis as Rapporteur.17 A full list of Task Force members can be
found on the ICCA website.18 The Task Force was composed to ensure representation of
a full range of stakeholders from geographically and industry distinct perspectives,
including arbitrators, in-house counsel and parties, external counsel, representatives with
administrative functions in arbitral institutions, academics, and a range of funders.
The first meeting of the Task Force was a roundtable discussion held in London in
February 2014. It focused on presentations and policy discussions among participants
organized around a series of the most salient issues arising from the participation of thirdparty funders, with action items proposed for each topic. These topical discussions,
which were each led by individual members, included the potential for conflicts of
interest among funders and arbitrators, confidentiality and attorney privilege issues,
allocation of costs and security for costs, internal and industry-based self-regulatory
models for funders, and the implications of third-party funding in investment arbitration.
These topics and the proposed action items are discussed in turn below.

A. Defining Third-Party Funders
Although not initially a distinct topic for discussion by the Task Force, the need
for a working definition of Third-Party Funding quickly became clear. The significant
disagreement about the exact nature of third-party funding is part of what contributes to
open questions about whether, how, or to what extent it could or should be regulated.
Although often described as a monolithic group, there is significant variety among
funders. Funders have different types of cases as targets for investment, operate and fund
in different jurisdictions and practice areas, and have widely variant internal practice
guidelines.
One reason why third-party funding is difficult to define is that economic interests
in a party or a dispute can come in many shapes and sizes. 19 Arrangements may be
structured as debt instruments, equity instruments, risk-avoidance instruments, or as full
transfers of the underlying claims. Some agreements permit or require active
participation of the third-party funder in key strategic decisions in the case, while other
agreements are limited to periodic updates.
Conventional definitions are limited to agreements entered into after a dispute has
arisen, but they can be entered into either before or after the case is filed. Moreover,
many funding arrangements are not necessarily entered into between the principal funder
and  the  party.    Funders  often  create  “special  purpose  vehicles”  that  are  separate corporate
structures from the funders themselves to facilitate the funding arrangement.20 In some
16

See Leo Szolnoki, ICCA and Queen Mary examine third-party funding, GLOBAL ARB. REV.
(Oct. 11, 2013), http://globalarbitrationreview.com/news/article/31962/.
17
Professor of Commercial Law and International Arbitration at Queen Mary
18
ICCA Projects, Third-Party Funding, http://www.arbitrationicca.org/projects/Third_Party_Funding.html (last accessed Oct. 6, 2014).
19
Anthony J. Sebok, The Inauthentic Claim, 64 VAND. L. REV. 61, 63-67 (2011).
20
See Cento Veljanovski, Third-Party Litigation Funding in Europe, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 405,
430   (“[Third-party litigation funding investors] rely on Special Purpose Vehicles, which . . . are legal
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situations, funders may provide financing directly to law firms. In addition to variations
in structure, the conditions for funding and for recovery by a third-party funder also vary
significantly. A typical agreement provides for funders to receive a percentage of
recovery, and the percentage increases with the passage of time since the initial
investment.
Even when funding agreements are entered into directly between a client and the
funder, it is not simply a bilateral relationship. The funding arrangement often involves a
symbiotic   relationship   with   the   party’s   law   firm.      Law   firms   may encourage, facilitate,
and (according to anecdotal evidence from funders) even initiate  parties’  application  for  
third-party funding. Outside funding can cover firms’ fees and reduce their own risk if,
for instance, the case were instead to be structured around a contingency fee arrangement.
Informal agreements, with various degrees of specificity, often exist between funders and
law firms. These agreements, as well as the primary funding agreements with parties,
may   involve   specified   reductions   in   a   law   firm’s   contingency   fee   or   hourly   rates;;   they  
may establish flat fee billing or some hybrid fee structure.
Although most third-party funding arrangements are generally entered into for
profit, that is not always the case. For example, in the investment arbitration case
brought by Philip Morris against Uruguay, The Bloomberg Foundation and its
“Campaign  for  Tobacco-Free  Kids”  provided  outside  financial  support  for  the  Uruguayan  
government.21 This arrangement seems to have much more in common with pro-bono
support for legal causes than more conventional definitions “third-party funding,” but
arguably raises some similar issues.
In its initial discussions, the Task Force quickly decided that a working definition
of third-party funding would be useful, both for discussion purposes and as a starting
point for several of the practical projects that the Task Force will be taking up.
Consensus on the Task Force was that a definition of third-party funding or third-party
funders might vary depending on the purpose for which the definitions are used. As the
Task Force first considered the potential for conflicts of interest as between funders and
arbitrators, it developed a working definition for that context.
Although potentially subject to revision, that working definition developed by the
Task Force is:
The  terms  ‘third-party  funder’  and  ‘after-the-event-insurer’  refer  to  any  
person or entity that is contributing funds or other material support to the
prosecution or defense of the dispute and that is entitled to receive a
benefit (financial or otherwise) from or linked to an award rendered in the
arbitration.

entities created for . . . the acquisition, financing, or both, of a project or the set up of an investment. They
are usually used because they are free from preexisting obligations and debts, and are separate from the
parties  that  set  them  up  for  tax  and  insolvency  purposes.”)  
21
See Press  Release  by  Uruguay’s  Counsel,  Foley  Hoag  LLP,  Government of Uruguay Taps Foley
Hoag for Representation in   International   Arbitration   Brought   by   Philip   Morris   to   Overturn   Country’s  
Tobacco
Regulations,
Oct.
8,
2010,
http://www.foleyhoag.com/news-andevents/news/2010/october/uruguay-taps-foley-hoag-for-representation (last accessed Oct. 6, 2014).
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This definition of third-party funders attempts to capture a more full range of
funding relationships that currently exist, without being so overly broad as to require
disclosure of entities such as minor equity investors or creditors. While there was
significant consensus about this definition, there was also considerable debate and
disagreement on the Task Force about whether this definition should include ordinary
insurers.
On the one hand, traditional insurers have interests in and may also exercise
control  over  key  aspects  of  a  party’s  case  strategy,  such  as  control over settlement. As a
practical matter, such control may, particularly in individual cases, be functionally similar
to more conventional third-party funders and after-the-event insurers. For some members
of the Task Force, these similarities raised questions of fairness in treating similarly
situated entities in similar manner for the purposes of disclosure.
On the other hand, there were concerns that ordinary insurers are ubiquitous and
have not historically been considered as subject to assessment with respect to potential
arbitrator conflicts. Some members of the Task Force believed that this approach was a
historical anomaly that should be corrected in conjunction with taking up the issue of
third-party funding, while others suggested that exclusion of traditional insurers was a
structural feature of dispute settlement that should not be tampered with and could be
maintained as separate from the issue of third-party funding. One reason for this latter
perspective is that before-the-event insurers generally do not specifically and
intentionally identify an existing case as a specific target of their investment. As a result,
before-the-event insurers may may be presumed to be less directly involved in the
specifics of case management than third-party funders are. This is undoubtedly a
definitional issue that the Task Force will continue to explore in its future work.

B. Potential Conflicts of Interest with Arbitrators
Although some commentators have argued against the possibility of conflicts of
interest as between funders and arbitrators, the Task Force quickly arrived at consensus
that there are real and important concerns about potential conflicts. Several factors
contribute to this perception, including the increase in the number of cases involving
third-party funding, the highly concentrated segment of the funding industry that invests
in international arbitration cases, the symbiotic relationship between funders and a small
group of law firms, and, relatedly, the often close relations among elite law firms and
leading arbitrators.22 Against this backdrop, after developing a definition, the first action
item taken up by the Task Force was to consider disclosure obligations and potential for
conflicts of interest with arbitrators.
At the time of its first meeting, these issues were already under consideration by
the IBA Sub-Committee on the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International
Arbitration, which was undertaking to amend the IBA Guidelines to address potential
22

See Mark J. Goldstein, Should the Real Parties in Interest Have to Stand Up?—Thoughts About
a Disclosure Regime for Third-Party Funding in International Arbitration, TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT.
(2011), http://www.transnational-dispute-management.com, at 7. See also Maxi Scherer, Aren Goldsmith,
& Camille Fréchet, Third Party Funding of International Arbitration Proceedings—A View From Europe:
Part II: The Legal Debate, 6 INT’L BUS. L. J. 649, 651-53 (2012) (discussing third-party funder disclosure
obligations in the context of potential arbitrator impartiality issues).
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conflicts of interest that may arise when third-party funders participate in arbitral
disputes. The discussion below provides some background analysis of why amendments
were needed to the IBA Guidelines to address issues relating to disclosure and potential
conflicts of interest.
Even if funders are not formally parties, they do participate with varying degrees
in various stages of an arbitration. Thus, one of the most obvious potential sources of
conflict is if an individual arbitrator were repeatedly appointed in cases involving the
same third-party funder. With law firms and parties, when the frequency of repeat
appointments reaches a certain threshold, that history is generally regarded as raising
possible concerns about influence or inter-dependency. For this reason, the 2004 IBA
Guidelines required that when an arbitrator has had more than two appointments in the
last three years by the same party23 and three or more appointments in the last three years
by the same law firm, 24 the repeat appointments must be disclosed. It is worth
emphasizing that these past appointments are not necessarily a basis for disqualification,
but they raise sufficient concern to warrant disclosure and to raise the possibility of
disqualification.
Third-party funders also raise some unique concerns that are distinct from those
that arise with either law firms or parties. For example, take the case of one party that is
funded by a funder, which involves a particular individual as the presiding arbitrator in
one arbitral dispute, but that same presiding arbitrator also serves as counsel to the
claimant in another unrelated second arbitration, which is funded by the same funder who
participated in selecting the participating arbitrator. The presiding arbitrator acting as
counsel in the second arbitration has fees paid by the funder, and likely has significant
contacts with the funder for the purposes of representation. The financial arrangement
and ongoing contacts arguably raise questions about  the  presiding  arbitrator’s  impartiality  
and independence in the first arbitration.25
The resolution of the problem illustrated above may seem self-evident, but only if
the arbitrators are aware of the existence of the relevant funding agreements. Currently,
parties have no obligation to reveal the participation of third-party funders in a dispute.
The simple presence of a funder in an international arbitration case is therefore most
often unknown or unknowable. More importantly,   the   nature   of   funders’   relationships
with attorneys and funded parties is generally unknown, as are funders’ levels of
involvement in case management and strategy, including the selection of arbitrators or
expert witnesses.
Particularly given the very real possibility that the existence of the funding
agreement may be later discovered (and has in fact caused problems in certain cases), one
starting proposition for the IBA Sub-Committee and the Task Force was that some form
of disclosure would be necessary, at least to arbitrators directly. Moreover, clearer
23

IBA GUIDELINES ON CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, § 3.3.2 (2004)
[IBA GUIDELINES].
24
Id. at § 3.3.7.
25
This hypothetical was developed by Maxi Scherer in Out in the open? Third-party funding in
arbitration, CDR NEWS, July 26, 2012, available at http://www.cdr-news.com/categories/expert-views/outin-the-open-third-party-funding-in-arbitration (last accessed Oct. 6, 2014).
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guidance was needed about when such participation may raise questions about potential
conflicts for arbitrators, warranting disclosure or even recusal or disqualification.
The Task Force was invited to provide comments on the proposed draft
Guidelines and passed along its assessments on these issues. The Task Force looks
forward to publication of the amendments to the IBA Guidelines, which will occur just as
this article is going to press.

C. Ongoing Work
Currently the Task Force has formed several Working Groups to address other
issues, such as allocation of costs and security for costs, confidentiality and attorneyclient privilege, guidelines for best practices among funders in international arbitration,
and funding in investment arbitration. These topics are commented on in general terms
below. It is important to note, however, that while the discussion below frames the
relevant issues, work on these topics is ongoing and the final output of various Working
Groups may vary as they consider more deeply even how to define the range and
importance of various issues.

1. Allocation of Costs and Security for Costs
The presence of third-party funding is increasingly being raised as an issue in
applications for security for costs, as well as in final applications regarding allocations of
costs. There have been anecdotal reports of funded claimants who ultimately do not
prevail being unable to pay costs. Because funding is relatively new, and understanding
of the nature of funding and the reasons for it are not always very well understood among
arbitrators, counsel, and parties, concerns have been raised about relying on assumptions
and intuition instead of careful analysis in working through these issues in individual
cases. Moreover, both of these issues are seminally important for funders as they affect
the case profile and fundamental considerations in determining whether to fund it. The
starting premise for the Task Force and this Working Group is that more guidance is
needed regarding the various factors that might be relevant in addressing applications for
costs and security for costs, and that a sensible approach can be developed that takes into
account the various concerns and substantive issues.

2. Confidentiality and Attorney-Client Privilege
While some funders seek to avoid obtaining privileged information and written
legal   analysis   from   the   claimant’s   counsel, other funders habitually seek access to
confidential information in order to assess and monitor the progress of cases in which
they invest. After all, how does a third-party funder properly evaluate the causes of
action without obtaining confidential or privileged information at the heart of a case?
This practice raises a host of difficult issues. Does providing such confidential or
privileged information to third-party funders constitute a waiver? The answer to this
question may in turn depend on whether the jurisdiction whose privilege rules apply
recognize a privilege for third-party funders or a so-called common interest exception.
Even a seemingly straightforward determination of which privilege rules apply may be
difficult, and, once determined, considerable variation exists from country to country.
Meanwhile, even in those countries with relatively well-developed third-party funder
8

regimes, answers to these questions are not always clear and it is a distinct possibility that
different rules could apply to different parties and funders in the same proceeding. For
these reasons, this Working Group is investigating whether it would be possible and
productive to develop international standardized evidentiary privilege standards that
relate to third-party funding.

3. Best Practices
One of the most striking features of third-party funding concerns how it is
virtually immune to regulation in international arbitration. While some national systems
have limited rules that apply to funders and their participation in national litigation, those
rules end up having little or no effect on funding of international arbitration claims. One
reason is that funding agreements generally select applicable law and forums for
enforcement that avoid jurisdictions that prohibit or significantly limit funding
arrangements.
This is one area where there was considerable disagreement among Task Force
Members. Some believed that individual funders could and should develop internal rules
to govern their conduct. The concern was that external guidelines, particularly imposed
without any enforcement mechanism, would operate effectively as a burden on
upstanding funders, while doing little or nothing to curb potential abuses by lessscrupulous funders.
Despite the potential for disagreement, there was general consensus that a
Working Group be created to consider the potential for developing such best practice
guidelines, and the viability of an enforcement mechanism, such as membership or
certification of compliance.

4. Investor-State Arbitration
For all the questions and issues raised by third-party funding in
international arbitration generally, there remain additional issues specific to investment
arbitration. As already noted, third-party funding is almost exclusively available for
claimants, which in investment arbitration necessarily means investors. Anecdotal
evidence also indicates that investment arbitration cases may be more expensive to bring
and sustain than the typical commercial case, but also have more potentially higher value
outcomes. All this suggests that third-party funding may (and perhaps already has begun
to) increase the total number of investment claims brought against States.
Other related issues raised during initial Task Force discussions on this topic
involve the relationship between third-party funding and political risk insurance, issues
regarding  the  status  of  funders  (can  they  qualify  as  an  “investor”  under  BITs), and related
questions about whether and to what extent States can be deemed to have consented to
arbitrate with funders. Finally, the often undisclosed presence of third-party funders has
also drawn criticism as inconsistent with current efforts to make investor-state arbitration
more transparent.
Given the complexity and implication of these issues, the Task Force formed a
special Investment Arbitration Working Group to consider them in depth. This Working
Group has expanded beyond the initial Task Force membership in order to bring in
specialized expertise and perspectives that are unique to investment arbitration. In
9

addition to the range of funders, arbitrators, and law firms drawn from the Task Force
directly, the Investment Arbitration Working Group also includes (either in their official
or in some instances in their personal capacity): the Secretary General of ICSID;
representatives from various States, including the Dominican Republic, Egypt, Germany,
Singapore, Slovakia Spain, the United States, and others; and representatives from
international organizations such as the International Court of Justice, UNCTAD, and the
OECD.
The Working Group has also tapped in-house counsel from major corporations
who are active in investment arbitration, leading arbitrators who specialize in investment
disputes, and academics doing specific research in the area of third-party funding of
investment arbitration claims. A final list of the membership of the Investment
Arbitration Working Group will be published soon.
The Investor-StateWorking Group is currently scheduled to meet in January 2015.
While the Working Group will ultimately determine its own mission and activities at that
meeting, its overall function will be to analyze relevant issues and make policy and
practical recommendations. It may also build on the work of the larger Task Force
regarding, for example, issues such as security for costs and proposed best practices for
third-party funders—as those topics raise unique issues in investment arbitration.
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